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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POST-CONVICTION DUE PROCESS-RIGHT
OF INDIGENT TO REVIEW OF NON-CONSTITUTIONAL TRIAL ERRORS-

The past thirty years have seen a steady expansion in the concept
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of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.1
One of the most notable advances has been made in the realm of
post-conviction procedure. 2 Although a state is not required by
the Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right of appeal
at all,3 it must provide some "clearly defined method" whereby a
person. can present to a state court of last resort his claim that hewas denied some constitutional right at his trial.4
The purpose of this comment is to examine a new development.
in post-conviction due process: Griffin v. Illinois.5 This case announces a new principle of constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment based on an almost indistinguishable combination of due process and equal protection elements.6
I.

Griffin v. Illinois: The Right to "Adequate and Effective"
Appellate Review

Petitioners Griffin and Crenshaw were tried together -and convicted of armed robbery in the Criminal Court of Cook County,
Illinois. They immediately filed a motion in the trial court askingthat a certified copy of the entire record, including ·the stenographic transcript, be furnished to them w~thout cost. They alleged
that they had no funds with which to purchase the transcript and
court records, that the documents were needed in order to· prosecute an appeal, and that failure of the court to provide the documents would violate the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment._ Illinois law provides that indigent
defendants sentenced to death may obtain a free transcript to assist
their appeals,7 but this privilege is not extended to other criminal
defendants. Petitioners, not being sentenced to death, failed to
qualify for afree transcript under that provision. The Illinois PostConviction Hearing Act8 provides for free transcripts for persons
who desire to appeal denial of relief under its provisions, but only
1 Gr~en, "The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court,"
46 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1948).
·
2 See Boskey and Pickering, "Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13
UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 266 (1946); 53 CoL. L. REv. 1143 (1953).
8 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
4 Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
5 351 U .s. 12 (1956).
6 Some other advances in procedural due process have arisen out of cases where due
process and equal protection were likewise commingled. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86 (1923); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also Wilson, "The ·Merging Concep_ts of Liberty 1:1nd Equality," 12 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 182 (1955).
'1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, §769 (a).
8 Id., §§826-832.
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,constitutional trial errors can be raised under the act. Petitioners
did not contend that the errors they wished to appeal involved any
.constitutional questions, and so this first motion was not made
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The trial court denied
this first motion without a hearing.
They then filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act, alleging that there were manifest non-constitutional errors in
their trial and that they were entitled to have their convictions set
aside on appeal. They charged that they were denied their right
to full appellate review solely because of their poverty, since the
trial court had refused them a free transcript, and that this was a
denial of due process and equal protection. Their petition was
denied without a hearing, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
on the ground that no substantial constitutional questions (the
only kind of questions that could be raised under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act) had been presented. Their petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was granted.9
Illinois law gives every person convicted in a criminal trial the
right to review by writ of error.10 But this review extends only to
errors contained in the "mandatory record"11 unless the defendant
supplies the appellate court with a "bill of exceptions," and this
bill must include the transcript of those portions of the trial where
the errors charged occurred. The "mandatory record" does not
include such important sources of error as motions and rulings of
the trial court, evidence heard, instructions, etc. Thus the only way
full review can be had is by providing a bill of exceptions.12 To
obtain such a bill of exceptions, the defendant must procure a
stenographic transcript, for which he must pay unless he has been
sentenced to death. At one time the Illinois courts granted review
on the basis of a "bystanders' bill of exceptions," which was compiled from the memory of persons in attendance at the trial and
certified as correct by the judge; but the "bystanders' bill" has
fallen into disuse since the advent of court stenography. Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that even if "bystanders'
bills" are still recognized, they are not, as a practical matter, available to an incarcerated indigent.13 Petitioners, then, as indigents,
had no way of securing review of non-constitutional trial errors
9 349 U.S. 937 (1955).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, §769.1.
11 This consists of indictment, arraignment, plea, verdict, and
12 People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 81 N.E. (2d) 495 (1948).
IS People v. Joyce, 1 Ill. (2d) 225, 115 N.E. (2d) 262 (1953).
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unless they were given a free transcript from which they could
construct a bill of exceptions.
The Supreme Court held that review had been unconstitutionally denied to the petitioners. A state is not required to provide
appellate review, 14 but if appeal is allowed at all it must be extended equally to all persons. "Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts."15
Most of the cases in which the Court has extended the Fourteenth Amendment's protections in the area of criminal procedure
have found their bases in the requirements of the due process
clause. In some of these landmark cases the question of "fundamental fairness" has been colored by a strong element of "unreasonable discrimination,"16 but despite their equal protection
aspects these cases have been decided and accepted by the profession as rulings of procedural due process.17 The Griffin case also
presents a blending of due process and equal protection elements,
but it is not so clear that the ruling here is one of due process.
Part of the uncertainty stems from the fact that a majority of the
Court could not be mustered in support of any one of the four
opinions of the case. The majority justices, although noting the
presence of both equal protection and due process elements, did
not clearly say which of the two is the more basic. Justice Black's
opinion, in which three other justices joined, expressed the view
that the " .... constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow
no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups
of persons,"18 and applied this view to the Griffin case by concluding that "[t]here is no meaningful distinction between a rule which
would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court
and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate
review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in
advance."19 Does this mean that the case may be regarded as either
a due process or as an equal protection ruling, or does it mean that
14 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
15 Principal case at 19. Justice Black wrote

the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Clark. Justice Frankfurter concurred separately.
16 See note 6 supra.
17 There have been a few of these "blended" cases decided on the equal protection
issue. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255
(1942).
18 Principal case at 17. Emphasis supplied.
19 Id. at 18.
'
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the concurrent presence of both elements is the crucial factor?
There is no specific language in the opinion to indicate the answer.
However, the overall impression given by Justice Black's opinion
corresponds more closely to the traditional due process analysis than
to the usual equal protection analysis. He regards equal justice as
"the central aim of our entire judicial system,"20 and matters so fundamental as that are usually considered to be the substance of due
process. The import of Justice Black's opinion, then, seems to be
that an unreasonable discrimination in the dispensation of criminal justice-at trial or appellate levels-is an arbitrary denial of
fundamental fairness which the due process clause will not permit.
The case, in this view, turned on the combined incidence of both
equal protection and due process factors, with the latter predominating.
Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion concurring in the
new rule formulated in the chief opinion but expressing the view
that the new rule should not be given a retroactive effect. He, too,
pointed out both the equal protection and due process aspects of
the case,21 and, like Justice Black, he did not clearly designate one
or the other aspect as the primary one. However, Justice Frankfurter seemed to focus more of his attention on the unreasonableness of the discrimination inherent in Illinois' post-conviction
procedure. There is language in his opinion which conveys the
impression that Justice Frankfurter considered the equal protection issue the dominant one-perhaps a sufficient one-for the disposition he made of the case.22 Perhaps this is an additional reason
for his separate concurrence. If the differences, however, between
the Black view and the Frankfurter view are as clearcut as the
difference between due process and equal protection, probably
Justice Frankfurter would have placed more specific emphasis on
the point of distinction. His concurrence in the disposition of the
case does not help to resolve the uncertainty, since the disposition
of the case would be the same under either due process or equal
20Id. at 17.
21 "But neither the fact that a State may deny the right of appeal altogether, nor
the right of a State to make an appropriate classification, based on differences in crimes
and their punishments, nor the right of a State to lay down conditions it deems appro•
priate for criminal appeals, sanctions differentiations by a State that have no relation to
a rational policy of criminal appeal or authorize the imposition of conditions that offend
the deepest presuppositions of our society.'' Principal case at 21-22.
22 "When the case again reaches the Illinois Court, that court may, of course, find
within the existing resources of Illinois law means of according to petitioners effective
satisfaction of their constitutional right not to be denied the equal protection of the laws.''
Principal case at 25.
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protection. If equal protection is regarded as the dominant theme
in Justice Frankfurter's analysis, his view seems to be this: while
differentiations based on financial ability may not violate the equal
protection clause in some situations,23 such a discrimination is
unreasonable and offensive when exercised in the administration
of criminal justice. This view likewise rests on the concurrence of
both equal protection and due process elements, but here the
former are dominant.
If these interpretations of the two majority opinions are accurate, the precise significance of the Griffin case in constitutional
law is still in doubt, since a majority of the Court does not clearly
support any one view. Nevertheless, it is an important new development that must be reckoned with, and it cannot be examined without first drawing some conclusion as to what it says. Accordingly,
the analysis that follows treats the case on the basis of what seems
to be the "least common denominator" of both majority opinions,
viz., the coincidence of strong elements of both due process and
equal protection.

II. The Meaning of the Griffin Case
If the Griffin case had decided that all states which extend the
right of appeal to all must provide the right to proceed on appeal
in forma pauperis to indigents, the question of its effect would not
be too complicated. But the case does not go that far. The majority opinion was careful to add, "We do not hold, however, that
Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case
where a defendant cannot buy it. The Supreme Court [of Illinois]
may find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate
review to indigent defendants." 24 The case, then, lays down the
proposition that indigents must be afforded as "adequate and effective appellate review" as other criminal defendants; it does not
prescribe the same review procedure. The majority opinion suggests the possibility that a return to "bystanders bills of exceptions" might fulfill this requirement, but it does not otherwise
elaborate on what will be considered "adequate and effective." It
simply remands the question to the Illinois court with the implicit
direction to try again, stating "We are confident that the State
will provide corrective rules to meet the problem which this case
23 Cf: Clark v. Titusville, 184 U.S. 329 (1902). Cf. also Sholley, "Equal Protection in
Tax Legislation," 24 VA. L. REv. 229 at 256 et seq. (1938).
24 Principal case at 20.
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lays bare."211 The question of what review procedures will be considered "adequate and effective" can receive an authoritative answer only in future decisions. The fact, however, that the decision
in the Griffin case was such a close one indicates that future decisions may well find procedures "adequate and effective" which do
not go much farther than the Illinois system in providing appellate
review for indigents.
One other statement in the majority opinion may prove troublesome. What was meant by Justice Black's reservation that, "We
do not hold ... that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot buy it"?20 This
phrase may imply merely that a stenographer's transcript may not
always be necessary to secure equally "adequate and effective" review, and this probably is the meaning Justice Black intended,
judging from the context in which the phrase appears. On the
other hand, the phrase "not ... in every case" could be interpreted
as a holding that the scope of review required by the Griffin case
may vary, as in the "right to counsel" cases, with the nature of the
crime with which the defendant is charged. In support of this interpretation it may be pointed out that the conviction from which
appeal was sought in the Griffin case was for "armed robbery."
That crime in Illinois is a very serious one,27 carrying a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment and subjecting a person convicted
thereof to certain civil disabilities. 28 If the Griffin decision is regarded as essentially a due process ruling, it may be said that the
seriousness of the crime there involved might require more leniency in providing appeal in the interest of "fundamental fairness"
than would be demanded if a lesser crime were charged. The
nature of the crime charged is an important factor in determining
whether a criminal defendant is entitled to free counsel.20 Should
it not be likewise a factor in determining his right to a free appeal?
Even if the Griffin case finds its support solely in the equal protection clause, can it be said that a classification based on the severity of the crime charged is unreasonable? This sort of classification
has been upheld in the "right to counsel" cases.30
If this line of argument is accepted by the federal courts in
25Ibid.
20 Ibid.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, §501.
28 Id., §587.
20 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
SO Ibid.
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future cases, the meaning of the Griffin case will be uncertain indeed. To follow the analogy of the right to counsel cases would
entail deciding the right of indigent defendants to free appellate
review on a case by case basis. In view of the narrow division of the
Court on the question, as indicated by the four separate opinions in
the Griffin case, a case by case approach would set post-conviction
due process adrift in a sea of uncertainty, for the absence of one
member of the Court in the consideration of any given petition for
relief under the ruling of the Griffin case could cause a different
result in the disposition of that petition. States would be left uncertain as to whether their post-trial procedures complied with due
process requirements, and individual defendants would be uncertain as to their rights.
In addition to its effect in creating 'uncertainty, other objections can be made to the analogy of the right to counsel cases. In
the first place, it is clearly not the approach contemplated by the
opinions of Justices Black and Frankfurter. The general meaning
of both opinions is that any defendant entitled by law to review
of trial errors may not be denied such review solely by reason of
his poverty. It is the right to appeal that is significant, not the
character of the crime charged. Moreover, there is a fundamental
distinction between the right to counsel cases and the Griffin type
of situation. While it is undeniable that the assistance of skilled
counsel may be of inestimable value to a defendant, the presence
of counsel is not a sine qua non to access to the courts, as was the
availability of the transcript in the Griffin case. Indeed, in cases
where the existence of an attorney has been necessary to give incarcerated criminals access to the courts, this has been held an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection.31 If any analogy to
the right to counsel area is drawn, it should be limited to those
cases where access to the courts could be had only through an attorney. The better interpretation of the Griffin case, then, is that
it requires a state to provide appellate review for indigent criminal defendants equivalent to that provided for other criminal
defendants. 32 The seriousness of the crime should not be deter31 Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942). See also United States ex rel. Bongiorno v.
Ragen, (N.D. Ill. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 973, affd. (7th Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 349, cert. den.
325 U.S. 865 (1945).
32 Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion expresses the view that to require some defendants to pay for services which are given to others free involves a discrimination equally
as invidious as the one which denies services to those who cannot pay for them but
extends them to those who can.
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minative, except as it may bear on the question of "adequacy" of
the appeal.
Will the principle of the Griffin case be given application in
review of civil cases? There is little room to doubt that the majority opinions contemplated its application to criminal cases only.
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, guarantees that property
as well as life and liberty shall not be taken without due process
of law. A civil litigant who has exhausted his own resources in a
trial to preserve his property, or who has been deprived of his
resources by the judgment itself, is in a position analogous to that
of an indigent convict. To refuse him the right to a review of the
adverse judgment simply because he cannot pay the costs of appeal
in advance when such appeal is granted to others similarly situated
but better endowed would seem to involve, in principle, the same
denial of due process and equal protection as that claimed by petitioners Griffin and Crenshaw. There are, however, at least two factors which may serve to distinguish the case of the indigent civil
litigant. First, our legal system has traditionally been inclined to
regard "personal" rights, such as life and liberty, as entitled to
more deference than property rights, 33 i.e., the process that is "due"
in order to protect life and liberty may be more extensive than
that required to protect property. Since only five of nine justices
found an unconstitutional deprivation in the Griffin case, where
the petitioner's personal liberty was at staker it would not be safe
to assume that a majority of the Court would find a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment under the same circumstances if property rights only were involved.34 Secondly, the unconstitutional
elements in the Griffin case resulted solely from the action (or
inaction) of official state agents. The Fourteenth Amendment
serves to protect individual rights against infringement by the state
government, not infringement by individuals. While it is true
that a civil adjudication of property rights by a state is "state action" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,35 the
state's role in the resultant deprivation of one party's property is.
purely mediatory. The state does not act both as party and as,
33 An example of this tendency may be found in the tort law doctrine which limits
the amount of force that may be used against the person of a trespasser where only property interests are jeopardized by the trespass. " ..• [T]he law has always placed a higher
value upon human safety than upon mere rights in property•..." PROSSER, TORTS 133
(1941).
84 This situation might occur in a criminal case as well if the defendant were fined
rather than imprisoned.
35 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948).
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mediator, as it does in the criminal cases. The state may well be
required to go to greater lengths to insure fairness in situations
where it opposes the asserted rights of an individual in both of
these capacities. Therefore, it may not be an "invidious discrimination" to deny the right of appeal to an indigent civil litigant,
even though the sole basis of the denial is his poverty, and even
though an indigent criminal defendant would be entitled to appeal
in like circumstances. Justice Harlan, however, considered the
civil situation to be indistinguishable from that presented in the
Griffin case: "Thus, if requiring defendants in felony cases to pay
for a transcript constitutes a discriminatory denial to indigents of
the rights of appeal available to others, why is not a similar denial
in misdemeanor cases or, for that matter, civil cases? It is no answer
to say that equal protection is not an absolute, and that in other
than criminal cases the differentiation is 'reasonable.' The resulting classification would be invidious in all cases, and an invidious
classification offends equal protection regardless of the seriousness
of the consequences."36 This argument has merit, but it is directed
solely at the question of equal protection. He fails to consider the
due process aspect of the case in this particular statement. The
distinction between the due process and equal protection elements
here is not so clear as to justify an extension of the doctrine to civil
cases when that extension considers only one element to the exclusion of the other. Any extension of the doctrine of the Griffin
case should be limited to cases where due process and equal protection are similarly fused, and it should be applied only in criminal cases.

III. Impact ·of the Griffin Case
A. On state practice. Unless the Griffin principle is carried
over into the area of civil review, it probably will not cause any
immediate, significant changes in the practice of most states. In
twenty-nine states free transcripts are already provided as of right
to indigents convicted of non-capital crimes.37 Of the remaining
nineteen, five states have, by statute, expressly given the trial courts
discretionary power to provide such transcripts. Two more apparently have made transcripts available on a similar basis by decision
or by interpretation of statutes relating to reimbursement of ap· so Principal case at 35.
37 Id. at 33.
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pointed counsel.38 The procedures already provided in states
where the free transcript is available at the discretion of the trial
court will probably be "adequate and effective" so long as the trial
courts grant the transcript in every case where there is a reasonable
basis for appeal, for the Griffin case probably does not require free
review to be given to defendants who have no reasonable basis for
appeal, or who do not present a good faith claim for relief.39 The
right to a free transcript is discretionary with the trial judge in the
federal courts,40 and this procedure has never been held to violate
Fifth Amendment due process. It therefore appears that only
eleven states have no provision for making free transcripts available on a satisfactory basis.
Even the practice in these eleven states, however, may not need
to be changed.41 In the Griffin case, not only were petitioners denied a free transcript, but that transcript was necessary in order to
secure a full appellate review. It will only be those states who not
only deny the free transcript, but who also require a transcript for
review, that will be forced by the Griffin case to modify their practice. For example, if a state permits the use of the "bystanders bill
of exceptions" in lieu of appeal based on the transcript, this would
probably satisfy the standard set forth in Justice Black's opinion.
As to the situation in Illinois, counsel for the state expressed
the belief in the Griffin case that if the treatment of petitioners
violated the due process and equal protection clauses, the Illinois
Post-Conviction Hearing Act entitles them to a free transcript.42
While this may be true, it would seem to be an unnecessarily complicated process. That act, by its terms, applies only to a "person
imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings
which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of
his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the
State of Illinois or both...." 43 Overlooking the limitation of the
act's coverage to persons "imprisoned in the penitentiary," it will
38 See principal case at 33, n. 4. See, generally, annotation, "Right of indigent defendant in a criminal case to aid of state as regards new trial or appeal," 100 A.L.R. 321
(1936).
30 See note 62 infra.
40 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1915 (b), 753 (f).
41 The Attorney General of Kansas has expressed the opinion that the Griffin case
requires Kansas courts to provide free transcripts to indigent criminal defendants for
appeal purposes. 5 KAN. L. REv. 132 (1956). The opinion also discusses the question of
possible retroactive effect of the Griffin ruling and the practical question of who must bear
the cost of the free transcript.
42 Principal case at 16.
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, §826.
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be noted that it applies only to the situation where there has been
a substantial denial of constitutional rights "in the proceeding
which resulted in his conviction." Griffin and Crenshaw did not
assert that there was any denial of constitutional rights in their
trial. Under the Supreme Court's ruling, no unconstitutionality
was involved until after the conviction had been rendered and the
--petitioners had moved for a free transcript. Even if the phrase
•'proceeding which resulted in . . . conviction" can be interpreted
to include the motion for a free transcript, there is no denial of a
constitutional right until the judge overrules the motion. Only
then could a defendant file a petition under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act. But this second proceeding, under the act, cannot,
of itself grant a petitioner the free transcript. It can only determine whether or not a constitutional right has been denied. If
the hearing court rules that a constitutional right has been denied,
it can "enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or
sentence in the former proceedings and such supplementary orders
as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, or discharge as may be
necessary and proper."44 Presumably, all that the hearing court
can do, if it should find for a petitioner like Griffin and Crenshaw,
is to order the trial court to order the transcript. The circular
character of this process seems wholly unnecessary, particularly
since the court which hears the petition under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act is the same court which rendered the conviction and
the denial of the motion for a free transcript.45 Probably no real
harm will be done by this procedure, since the whole thing can
doubtless be accomplished at one sitting, but it would probably be
better simply to empower the trial court to provide the transcript
on the first motion, if no satisfactory existing means are found.
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,46 promulgated
in 1953, goes- farther than the Illinois act. States adopting the
uniform act probably need have little fear that their procedures
will not be "adequate and effective" under the commands of the
Griffin case. The uniform act not only attempts to provide a
"clearly defined method by which ... claims of federal right" may
be raised, in accordance with the command of the Court in Young
v. Ragen;41 it also grants the same type of hearing for any other
collateral attack "upon any ground of alleged error heretofore
44 Id., §831.
45 Id., §826.
46 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LA.ws, 1955, p. 209. See also 69 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1956).
47 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
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available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or
other common law or statutory remedy...." 48 Even this broad
coverage, however, would make the scope of the uniform act no
broader than that of Illinois if there were not some other features
of the uniform act which serve to expand its applicability. Section
5 of the uniform act contains very liberal provisions for review
where the petitioner is "proceeding as a poor person." This provision provides that "all necessary costs and expenses" incident to
review, expressly including printing, stenographic services, and
attorney's fees, shall be paid for a petitioner who is himself unable
to pay.40 Moreover, the hearing judge under the uniform act is
empowered to make such orders, supplementary to his ruling on
the judgment and sentence, as "may be necessary and proper."50
By virtue of these powers, the hearing judge could fonvard the
case directly for appeal of the non-constitutional trial errors and
could also provide the necessary services free. There would be no
need for the circular steps which the Illinois act seems to entail.
B. On federal practice. One effect of the Griffin case on
federal practice is that it appears to create a new area in which
federal habeas corpus is available to correct state procedural defects. Heretofore, federal habeas corpus has been granted only
where constitutional trial errors were charged. Now federal courts
may grant habeas corpus in situations like that in the Griffin case
even when the only trial errors alleged are of a non-constitutional
character. This development yields the strange result that federal
courts could set free a prisoner whose trial was conducted in conformance with due process of law.
The federal habeas corpus law authorizes granting the writ
where a prisoner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution ...
of the United States.''51 It might be argued that this does not authorize federal habeas corpus in a Griffin type situation. The
petitioners there were in custody pursuant to an order of a duly
authorized court, and the order was entirely within the court's
jurisdiction. No violations of the petitioners' constitutional rights
occurred in the course of the trial. They were therefore committed to custody in conformance with due process by the judgment of conviction entered against them. It might be urged that
any violations of their constitutional rights occurring subsequently
-iS Uniform

Post-Conviction Procedure Act, §1. See note 46 supra.
§5. See note 46 supra.
c;o Id., §7. See note 46 supra.
Cil 28 U.S.C. (1952) §2241.
40 Id.,
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would have no effect on -the validity of their "custody."· This
argument, however, overlooks the fact that petitioners claimed a
right to release from that custody, and this right was denied them
in violation of the Constitution. In other words, after their motion for free appeal had been denied, solely because of their
poverty, petitioners were then in custody in violation of the Constitution, and they then became eligible for habeas corpus in the
federal courts.62
Assuming that federal habeas corpus is available to an indigent
prisoner claiming an unconstitutional denial of the right of appeal,
what disposition can the federal district court make of the case?
The law provides that the federal court shall ". . . dispose of the
matter as law and justice require." 53 If the federal court determines that the petitioner's right of appeal has been unconstitutionally denied, does "law and justice" require that he be set free?
This result does not seem to be called for. All that has been determined is that petitioner has a right to appeal. The federai court
has no power to set aside the judgment of conviction when it is
found to contain no constitutional errors. Other prisoners are
not set at large while their appeals are pending. But what other
disposition can the federal court make? It has no power to make
positive demands upon the state courts. All that can be done by
the federal court is to order the future release of the prisoner if the
state has not removed the obstacles to his appeal within a stated
reasonable time. Under such an order, if the state fails to remove
the obstacles, federal habeas corpus will set free a prisoner whose
incarceration had been effected by a conviction which no one
challenges as lacking in due process. It cannot be denied that this
is a new departure.64
The changes wrought by this new feature of federal habeas
corpus may not, however, be too far-reaching in practical effect.
As we have seen, most states probably will encounter little difficulty
in providing "adequate and effective" review to indigent criminals
under their existing laws. Moreover, even among those few states
which still may not provide the proper opportunity for review in
52 Of course, they were not fully entitled to seek federal habeas corpus until they had
appealed, and the state supreme court had affirmed, the denial of the motion. See 28
U.S.C. (1952) §2254. They might also be required to apply to the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari (as Griffin and Crenshaw, in fact, did) before applying for federal
habeas corpus. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
63 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2243.
64 See Holtzoff, "Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts," 25 Bosr. UNIV.
L. R.Ev. 26 (1945). In the situation presented in the text, the question would be raised as
to whether the prisoner so released could be subsequently re-tried.
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the first instance, it is very unlikely that any would fail to heed
the federal court's directive. Such non-compliance would ultimately be more costly for the state, for the costs of appeal would
not be so great as the cost to the state if the prisoner were to be
re-tried after his release by the order of the federal court.
A more subtle question raised by the Griffin case is that of its
meaning and effect for purposes of federal practice itself. Will the
Griffin ruling necessitate any changes in the rights accorded indigents convicted in the federal courts? At first sight it would seem
that no significant changes will be necessary. A federal statute
provides: "Any court of the United States may authorize .the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment
of fees and costs or security therefor, by a citizen who makes
affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor."55 This provision would seem to provide amply for "adequate
and effective" review for indigents. But to make sure there is no
chance of effective denial of these -rights, it is elsewhere provided
that "fees for transcripts furnished in criminal or habeas corpus
proceedings to persons allowed to sue, defend, or appeal in forma
pauperis shall be paid by the United States...." 56 From these
provisions it is clear that the federal practice contemplates equal
opportunities for indigents. This has not always been the result
in practice. Th_ese provisions have been held57 not to entitle an
indigent petitioner to a free transcript for use in preparing a motion to vacate under section 2255 of the federal judicial code.58
Such a holding, however, does not run contrary to the Griffin
ruling, for a trans~ript is not absolutely necessary to the prosecution
of a motion to vacate under section 2255. It is a convenience, of
course, to be able to comb the transcript for possible errors, but
access to the courts is available without it.59
The Griffin case will, however, involve a considerable change
in the theory under which federal practice extends equal rights
to indigents. It is clear that the federal courts have heretofore
regarded in forma pauperis proceedings as a matter of privilege,
not of right. "The right to appeal from a final decision of the
District Court is a matter of right, [but] the right to appeal as a
poor person, without being required to prepay fees and costs in
Iii.I

28 U.S.C. (1952) §1915 (a).

56 Id., §753 (f).

United States v. Stevens, (3d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 866.
(1952) §2255.
59 But see 104 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 552 (1956).
57

58 28 u.s.c.

428

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

the appellate court, is regulated by statute." 60 This theory ha,;
persisted largely because federal law gives the trial court power
to deny the privilege of in forma pauperis appeal by certifying
that the appeal is not taken "in good faith." 61 This discretion of
the trial court is not necessarily inconsistent with the due process
requirement of the Griffin case. 62 If an indigent convict is denied
appellate review only when he does not appeal in good faith, he
can scarcely have been denied "adequate and effective" review
commensurate with that available to non-indigents. The federal
judges have generally been careful to resolve every doubt in favor
of the petitioner before ruling that his appeal is taken in bad
faith. 63 Neither due process nor equal protection would seem to
require a court to hear bad faith appeals.
The fact that federal courts sometimes will grant the right to
appeal in forma pauperis, but refuse the right to a free transcript,64
is not in contradiction to the principle of the Griffin holding.
Such a transcript is not essential to appeal in the federal courts.
"Bystanders' bills of exceptions" -are permitted, though little used
in this day when free transcripts are liberally granted. 65
So far we have assumed that if the Griffin doctrine is due
process for the states, it will also be due process for the federal
government, demanded by the Fifth Amendment. The Court has
not previously held the states to stricter procedural requirements
in the name of due process than those prevailing in federal practice. Even if the Griffin case is interpreted as announcing a rule
of equal protection alone, this would not seem to deny it status as
a constitutional requirement in federal courts. The absence of a
federal eq~al protection clause has often been met by including
60 United States ex rel. Rasmussen v. Ragen, (7th Cir. 1945) 146 F. (2d) 516. See
also Clough v. Hunter, (10th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 516.
0128 U.S.C. (1952) §1915 (a).
62 The recent case of Johnson v. United States, (2d Cir. 1956) 25 U.S. Law Week 2213,
upholds this conclusion. In that case an indigent defendant argued that the Griffin ruling
required that he be provided a free transcript, despite the trial court's certification that
his appeal was not taken in good faith. The court of appeals refused to review the trial
court's certification unless defendant could show that the trial judge had acted in bad
faith in refusing the transcript. Judge Frank dissented. Only if a transcript were before
the court of appeals, he said, could it determine whether or not the trial court acted in
good faith. Therefore, in Judge Frank's view, refusal of a free transcript to defendant
denied him adequate and effective review commensurate with that provided for non-indigents. This view must rest upon the fact that a transcript is "necessary." Such a view
seems to overlook the availability of the "bystanders bill of exceptions"-a measure authorized by Juc;Ige Frank himself in United States v. Sevilla, (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 879as a means for providing a record for appellate review in federal courts. See note 65 infra.
63 See Parsell v. United States, (5th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 232.
64 Morris v. Igoe, (7th Cir. 1953) 209 F. (2d) 108.
65 Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 192, 601 (1942); United States v. Sevilla, (2d Cir.
1949) 174 F. (2d) 879.
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the rights secured against state infringement by the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection clause among those secured against
federal infringement in the Fifth Amendment due process clause.00
Thus, equal protection rights have sometimes been treated as constitutional demands on the federal system as well as on the states.
The Griffin case gives no indication that the equalization principle
it sets forth is to be considered as a "privilege of citizens of the
United States" rather than a due process requirement. Unless,
then, the Court intended the Griffin principle to apply to the
states only, which does not seem likely, it should now be regarded
.as a right guaranteed against federal infringement by the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
One interesting example of the effect of the holding might be
noted. Due process is a right of every person. Its protection is
not limited to citizens.67 Therefore, the right of an indigent alien
to "adequate and effective" review should be protected by the due
process clause in the same degree as the right of an indigent citizen.
This is not the case under current federal practice. It will be recalled that section 1915 of the federal judicial code68 limits the
right to proceed in forma pauperis to "citizens." Section 753 (£) 00
extends free transcripts only to "persons allowed to sue, defend, or
appeal in forma pauperis." Thus aliens are denied the right to
appeal in forma pauperis and the right to a free transcript.70 This
is not quite the same situation as that posed by the Griffin case, but
it seems to involve the same principle. An indigent alien is denied
as "adequate and effective" review as other persons similarly
situated, not because of his poverty, since the federal practice
compensates for inequalities in wealth, but solely because of his
alienage. Is this "due process" consistent with the Griffin opinion?
It would seem not. Due process extends to aliens and citizens
alike. Therefore alienage is not a reasonable basis of classification
on which to deny a right which has been declared to be guaranteed
by the due process clause.
Of course, the Griffin case did not say that in forma pauperis
appeal is mandatory. "Bystanders bills" may substitute for a
oo See Antieau, "Equal Protection Outside the Clause," 40 CALIF. L. REv. 362 (1952);
Wilson, "The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality," 12 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 182
(1955).
07 " ••• nor shall any person .•• be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.•• ," U.S. CONST., Amend. V.
os 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1915 {a).
69 28 u.s.c. (1952) §753 (f).
70 DeMaurez v. Swope, (9th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 530; United States v. Sevilla, (2d
Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 879.
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stenographer's transcript in federal courts. Free counsel can be
appointed for aliens.71 This was the manner in which appeal was.
provided for the defendant alien-indigent in United States v.
Sevilla. 12 But there was no way in which the "filing fee" in the
appellate court could be paid for Sevilla-that much he had to
provide from his own resources. Perhaps the review provided in
the Sevilla case could be considered "adequate and effective." But
·what if he had been so poor that he could not even pay the $25
filing fee? If this were the case, the situation would be indistinguishable from the Griffin case.73 Sevilla would be deprived of
the right to appeal enjoyed by others solely because of his poverty.
A case is conceivable, then, under today's federal practice where
"adequate and effective". appellate review may be denied an indigent criminal defendant solely because of his poverty.
The fact that free appeal is not provided for aliens-at least
not on the same basis as for citizens-indicates that appeal has not
in fact been a matter of right in the federal courts. The theory of
appeal will be changed as a result of the Griffin case, even though
there may be little effective impact in actual practice.

Summary
The Griffin case is an amalgam of equal protection and due
process elements. It is- a novel development in theory, but the
immediate changes it will impose in actual practice will probably
fall far short of being revolutionary. Most states already provide
procedures for review which, with very little alteration, will prob•
ably conform to that demanded by the Griffin case. The existing
federal practice (with minor exceptions) probably goes farther
than is required in providing equal opportunities for review to
indigents. It is impossible to speculate on the ultimate impact of
the Griffin case on the future course of constitutional law. Certainly it goes farther than any case to date in imposing a constitutional duty on the states to equalize the economic circumstances of
its citizens. But whether this equal protection aspect of the case
will have individual vitality when separated from the strong due
process element which was present in the Griffin case will remain
to be answered in the future. 74
Robert C. Casad, S.Ed.
7128 U.S.C. (1952) §1915 (d); United States v. Sevilla, (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 879.
72 (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 879.
73 The conclusion seems inescapable unless the $25 would be considered de minimis.
74 See Wilson, "The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality," 12 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 182 (1955).

